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 Good Urban Law: What is it and how to draft it 
By Professor Helen Xanthaki1 
  
Amidst a bombardment of legislation catapulted on citizens from their national legislatures and 
international fora in the area of urban law, little debate is offered on what constitutes good 
urban legislation and how it can be achieved. The objective of this paper is to define good law, 
and identify innovative advances to legislative drafting as a means of inviting further debate 
both by legislative experts but mainly by experts in the substantive fields of urban law, where 
application of legislative principles is empirically available, already well researched, and 
ultimately useable under the legislative studies umbrella.   
The paper will begin with an exploration of the definition of good urban legislation and 
the identification of its constituting elements. The latest innovations on plain language, as a 
crucial element of legislative quality, will be explored next: identifying the audience or 
audiences of urban law and pitching the legislative texts to their level of legal awareness. The 
paper will finish with ‘blue sky’ proposals, in other words tools for good legislation that have 
not yet been applied in practice by the national legislatures but have already been identified as 
advantageous future possibilities: the layered approach in legislative structure, the use of 
typography and pictures in legislative texts, the use of IT tools to enhance an understanding of 
the architecture of the whole statute book, and ultimately phronetic legislative drafting as a 
theoretical umbrella for good urban law.  
  
1. What is good urban legislation?      
Defining good legislation, let alone good urban legislation, is no easy task. And much of what 
the answer will be depends on the prism under which the question is asked. But from a pure  
legislative perspective, good legislation is legislation that manages to achieve the desired 
regulatory results.2  In other words, good urban legislation is, quite simply, legislation that 
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 manages to achieve the urban policy goals set by urban regulators at the international level 
(for example UN Habitat) or at the national level. 
And so urban legislation is quite closely linked to urban regulation. Their precise 
relationship is identified within a non-functional 3  context. Mousmouti and Voermans 
distinguish between legislative quality as an issue closely linked to the constitutional principles 
of legality, effectiveness and legal certainty, and regulatory quality as an issue related to the 
success of legislation in promoting economic development.4 Since governments use legislation 
as a tool of successful governing5, namely as a tool for putting into effect policies that produce 
the desired regulatory results5, the qualitative measure of successful legislation coincides with 
the prevalent measure of policy success, which is the extent of production of the desired 
regulatory results.6 Provided that the government’s choice is indeed to put a policy to effect 
rather than only on paper.7 Within this context, regulation is the process of putting government 
policies into effect to the degree and extent intended by government.8 And legislation, as one 
of the many regulatory tools available to government9, is the means by which the production 
of the desired regulatory results is pursued. And in application of Stefanou’s scheme on the 
policy, legislative, and drafting processes11, legislative quality is a partial but crucial 
contribution to regulatory quality.12  
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 With reference to urban law, this definition of legislative quality requires legislation 
that manages to produce the policy aims intended by the urban regulators, be it international 
organisations, national governments, Ministers, or local authorities. Urban legislation is used 
as one of the tools available to urban regulators to achieve the policy results intended. This 
presupposes an understanding of the concrete urban policy results set to be achieved. It is no 
good seeking for, for example, a better urban infrastructure. This is a rather aspiring super goal 
that has to be broken down to its concrete parts, in order to make it concrete enough for 
legislative treatment. And do pursuing better infrastructure is narrowed down to just one aspect 
of better water infrastructure, which in turn is narrowed down further to better water and 
wastage infrastructure. This requires a study of the elements of each of these two issues, an 
agreement on what policy aim is preferred by the urban regulators, and a continuous 
reassessment and agreement of further concrete policy dilemmas, such as where will the 
boundaries of the infrastructure be (do village communities fall under the scope of urban water 
infrastructure), what kind of infrastructure is promoted, who will build it, who will maintain 
it, what happens if there is a dispute, and what precise goals are to be achieved by what period 
of time (for example, coverage of all inner city areas in the country within 5 years, coverage 
of communities within 8 years and coverage of the whole urban area within 15 years). It is 
these answers to the regulatory dilemmas and the concrete regulatory goals that the legislation 
will adopt, express, and contribute to achieve. 
Can urban legislation singlehandedly achieve the regulatory aims? Let’s have a look at 
this diagram of elements of regulatory and legislative quality.14   
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Efficacy is synonymous to regulatory quality: it is defined as the extent to which regulators 
achieve their goal10, or the measure to which the performance data of the legislation match its 
objectives.11 Bradnee Chambers distinguishes between rule based positivist models of efficacy 
that look at the level of compliance achieved; social legal models12 that assess efficacy by 
reference to the compliance of rules with societal norms and values falling within the 
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 ‘established milieu’13 or to their legitimacy leading to compliance20; the economic legal model 
that include cost efficiency to the measure of efficacy;14 and international relations models that 
call for clearer distinctions between efficacy, implementation, and compliance.  
Irrespective of what model of efficacy one promotes, efficacy cannot be achieved by 
the legislation alone.22 In other words, legislation on its own cannot possibly produce the 
desired regulatory results (unless as a chance event). And urban drafters must not undertake 
the burden of failure on their shoulders alone. Bad policy can never produce the desired results, 
even with the best legislation at hand: for example, trying to achieve social inclusion for non- 
urban communities by extending water facilities to them cannot produce the desired result 
without additional measures directed to social inclusion. Bad implementation of the 
legislation23 and bad judicial application may interfere adversely24 against efficacy: although 
the margin for incorrect implementation and judicial application may be minimised by the 
legislative text,25 the problem may always be with the content of the pursued policy or the 
calculations of the regulatory impact assessment made for the allocation of resources for 
implementation.   
  Although efficacy is not purely a legislative issue, legislative effectiveness does 
contribute to regulatory efficacy.26 Effective laws are good laws. Effectiveness is used widely 
but without an agreed definition: the EU calls for accountability, effectiveness, and 
proportionality as a means of achieving better law-making, but without defining the terms27; 
and the UK Office of Parliamentary Counsel repeat their aspiration to effectiveness as a 
contribution to or in balance with accuracy but do not define the term.28 Mader defines 
effectiveness as the extent to which the observable attitudes and behaviours of the target 
population correspond to the attitudes and behaviours prescribed by the legislator.29 Snyder 
defines effectiveness as ‘the fact that law matters: it has effects on political, economic and 
social life outside the law – that it, apart from simply the elaboration of legal doctrine’.30 
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legislative measure has achieved a concrete goal without suffering from side effects.15 In 
Jenkins’s socio-legal model effectiveness in the legislation can be defined as the extent to 
which the legislation influences in the desired manner the social phenomenon which it aims to 
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 address.16 Voermans defines the principle of effectiveness as a consequence of the rule of law, 
which imposes a duty on the legislator to consider and respect the implementation and 
enforcement of legislation to be enacted.17 Mousmouti describes effectiveness as a measure of 
the causal relations between the law and its effects: and so an effective law is one that is 
respected or implemented, provided that the observable degree of respect can be attributed to 
the norm.18   
Effectiveness is the ultimate measure of quality in legislation.19 It expresses the extent 
to which the legislation manages to introduce adequate mechanisms capable of producing the 
desired regulatory results.20 If one subjects effectiveness of legislation to the wider semantic 
field of efficacy of regulation as its element, effectiveness manages to hold true even with 
reference to diverse legislative phenomena, such as symbol legislation, or even the role of law 
as a ritual. If the purpose of legislation is to serve as a symbol, then effectiveness becomes the 
measure of achieved inspiration of the users of the symbol legislation. If the legislation is to 
be used as a ritual, effectiveness takes the robe of persuasion of the users who bow down to its 
appropriate rituality. Effectiveness requires a legislative text that can (i) foresee the main 
projected outcomes and use them in the drafting and formulation process; (ii) state clearly its 
objectives and purpose; (iii) provide for necessary and appropriate means and enforcement 
measures; (iv) assess and evaluate real-life effectiveness in a consistent and timely manner.38  
Leaving cost efficiency out of the equation, since it is an economico-political rather 
than purely legal choice21, effectiveness is promoted by clarity, precision, and unambiguity.  
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 Clarity, or clearness,22 is the quality of being clear and easily perceived or understood.23 
Precision is defined as exactness of expression or detail.24 Unambiguity is certain or exact 
meaning:43 semantic unambiguity requires a single meaning for each word used25, whereas 
syntactic unambiguity requires clear sentence structure and correct placement of phrases or 
clauses.26 Clarity, precision, and unambiguity offer predictability to the law. Predictability 
allows the users of the legislation, including enforcers27, to comprehend the required content 
of the regulation. Predictability of effect is a necessary component of effectiveness and indeed 
of the rule of law.28 Thus, compliance becomes a matter of conscious choice for the user, rather 
than a matter of the users’ subjective interpretation of the exact content of the legislation and, 
ultimately, the regulation.  
  In turn, clarity, precision, and unambiguity are promoted by plain language and gender 
neutral language. Gender neutral language is a tool for accuracy: whilst calling for gender 
neutrality as a rule, it allows for gender specificity in drafting29 and before the courts30 where 
needed. Gender specific31 language serves in parallel with plain language as an additional tool 
for the promotion of precision, clarity, and unambiguity. The UK has introduced gender neutral 
language in its legislation for the last decade. Plain language as a concept encapsulates a 
qualifier of language which is subjective to each reader or user.32 Eagleson defines plain 
language as clear, straightforward expression, using only as many words as are necessary.52   
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 And so good urban law is effective urban law, law that contributes to the achievement of 
the desired urban regulatory results. How is it achieved? By means of clarity, precision, and 
unambiguity. In turn, these are achieved by gender neutral language and plain language. 
Plain language has been promoted as the main tool for achieving clarity and in turn 
effectiveness of legislation. As a result, its contribution to good legislation is crucial, and 
merits further exploration.  
  
2. Plain language: existing debate and modern trends  
  
Plain language is defined by Peter Butt as clear and effective for its audience.33 The plain 
language movement offers a wide range of principles that can lead to a legislative text that can 
be understood by the legislative users. But the blessing of its ambitious mandate constitutes its 
great weakness: plain language cannot be reduced to a standardised technical list of rules that 
apply uniformly. Plain language itself is a concept that is extremely difficult to define: it means 
many different things to different people. Reflecting the vagueness of plain language as a 
concept, Eagleson defines it as clear, straightforward expression, using only as many words as 
are necessary; language that avoids obscurity, inflated vocabulary and convoluted sentence 
structure. For Redish plain language means writing that is straightforward, that reads as if it 
were spoken; clear, direct, and simple; but with clarity and grace.  
 Thus, in its traditional definition plain language is a general and inevitably vague pursuit for 
techniques that can produce a text that may be understood by the users in the first reading. This 
in turn enhances clarity of the text, an attribute that makes it possible for users to adhere with 
the legislation, if they so wish. And it consequently promotes implementation, which is 
necessary for effectiveness. This is the crucial link between plain language and good 
legislation. But, if plain language is all about facilitating implementation, does it really matter 
if successful communication of the legislative message takes place in the first reading? This 
would be a good way of encouraging the user to read further, and so it is a good tool for making 
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 the text inviting. But a text, much more so a legislative text, understood at the second or third 
reading is equally commendable.   
Moreover, plain language is … not only about language. Words, syntax, punctuation 
are very important elements. But so are the structure of the legislative text, its layout on paper 
and screen, and the architecture of the whole statute book as a means of facilitating awareness 
of the interconnections between texts. And so plain language begins to kick in during the 
analysis of the policy and the initial translation into legislation, with the selection and 
prioritization of the information that readers need to receive. It continues with choices related 
to structure during the selection and design of the legislative solution, with simplification of 
the policy, simplification of the legal concepts involved in putting the policy to effect, and 
initial plain language choices of legislative expression (for example, a decision for direct 
textual amendments combined by a Keeling schedule, or a repeal and re-enactment when 
possible). Plain language enters very much into the agenda during composition of the 
legislative text. And remains in the cards during the text verification, where additional 
confirmation of appropriate layout and visually appeal come into play. And so plain language 
extends from policy to law to drafting.   
And so the existing concept of plain language relates to a holistic approach to 
legislation as a text, as a printed or electronic image, and as part of the statute book, which 
conveys a regulatory message to the users. Recent UK initiatives have advanced the plain 
language debate further by finally providing methodologically sound empirical data that set 
concrete parameters for its application. Plain language is a tool promoting uninhibited 
communication between the text and its users or, to personify the communication, between the 
drafter and the user. Identifying the people whose choice to act or not makes urban policy a 
success or a failure34 is crucial in establishing effective communication with them. Compliance 
with urban laws cannot occur without user awareness of what is being imposed; ineffectiveness 
of the legislative text is inevitable; and so is the failure of the underlying regulatory reform. 
This is confirmed by user testing experiments, such as the one undertaken by the Knight and 
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 Kimble team in the late 1990s35 or the Canadian studies by Schmolka, or the recent UK’s Good 
Law initiative. 
The drafter of primary urban legislation is, at least in the UK, a trained lawyer with 
drafting training and experience. The drafter of delegated urban legislation is, in the UK, a 
government lawyer in a relevant Department or a non-lawyer urban professional drafting for 
local authorities or agencies. The user of the legislative text can be anything from a senior 
judge to an illiterate citizen of below average capacity: urban law affects citizens of all 
intellectual capacities, and in fact it could be argued that more often than not it affects socially 
and financially vulnerable citizens. The inequality in the understanding of drafter and user of 
common terms, professional jargon, and legal terms renders communication a rather difficult 
task. This is all the more evident in urban legislation where complexity is not limited to legal 
terminology but also to the terminology of the professional discipline that the law expresses. 
Moreover, the users of urban laws range dramatically from Supreme Court judges interpreting 
the law to illiterate slum inhabitants in South America or Africa who are affected by the law. 
What could simplify the task somewhat would be the identification of the possible circle of 
users of the precise legislative text: identifying who the probable users of the law will be allows 
the text to ‘speak’ to them in a language that best meets their level of understanding.  
Until now identifying the users was a theoretical aspiration for drafters who tended to 
guess who the possible stakeholders of the legislation might be. Recent empirical data offered 
by a revolutionary survey of The National Archives in cooperation with the UK Office of 
Parliamentary Counsel have provided much needed answers.36 This has shown that the drafter 
cannot rely on the common notion of the ‘lay person’, the ‘average man on the street’58, the 
‘user’. The survey has proven beyond doubt that there are at least three categories of people 
that constitute ‘the audience of legislation’: lay persons reading the legislation to make it work 
for them 37 , sophisticated non-lawyers using the law in the process of their professional 
                                                 
35 See P. Knight, Clearly Better Drafting: A Report to Plain English Campaign on Testing Two Versions of 
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58 See D. Murphy, ‘Plain English-Principles and Practice’, Conference on Legislative Drafting, Canberra, 
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36 See https://www.gov.uk/good-law.   
37 See J. J. E. Gracia, A Theory of Textuality: The Logic and Epistemology (Albany, State University of  
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 activities, and lawyers and judges. In more detail in the UK there are three categories of users 
of legislation:  
a. Non-lawyers who needs to use legislation for work, such as law enforcers, 
human resources professionals, or local council officials; the ‘Mark Green’ of the survey 
represents about 60% of users of legislation;  
b. Lay persons who seeks answers to questions related to their personal or  
familial situation; ‘Heather Cole’ represents about 20% of users of legislation; and  
c. Lawyers, judges, and senior law librarians; the ‘Jane Booker’ persona  
represents about 20% of users of legislation.38   
  
The significance of the survey for plain language and good legislation cannot be understated. 
The survey provides, for the first time in UK legislative practice, empirical evidence from a 
huge sample of the 2,000,000 visitors of www.legislation.gov.uk per month. The survey, 
whose data relate to users of electronic versions of the free government database of legislation 
only, destroys the myth that legislation is for legal professionals alone. In fact, legal 
professionals are very much in the minority of users, although their precise percentage may 
well be affected by their tendency to use subscription databases rather than the government 
database, which is not annotated and often not updated. Whatever the exact percentages of 
each category are, there is significant empirical evidence that in the UK legislation speaks to 
three distinct groups of users, whose legal awareness varies from none, to limited, to full. But 
is the legal awareness of the users the only parameter for plain language as a means of effective 
legislative communication?  
  Pitching the legislative text to the ‘right’ level requires an additional consideration. 
Having pinpointed the rough profiles of the audience of legislation, the next parameter for 
plain communication is the topic of the legislative text. In view of the breadth of topics falling 
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 under the urban law agenda, offering a blanket answer to this is not possible. What one could 
call for is for the drafter to take account of the topic of the legislation at hand, and combine 
this with the consideration of possible audiences. For example, the main users of 
telecommunications legislation are inevitably government departments dealing with the 
fragments of the regulatory framework, companies dealing with the handling of the 
infrastructure, and judges and lawyers engaging in statutory interpretation and dispute 
resolution. Here, the language and terminology used can be sophisticated: paraphrasing the 
term ‘network’ with a plain language equivalent would lead the primarily learned audience to 
the legitimate assumption that the legislation means something other than ‘network’ and would 
not easily carry the interpretative case-law of ‘network’ through. And so this type of urban law 
can be drafted in a specialist language, albeit with a caveat: a primarily sophisticated audience 
cannot serve as a ‘carte blanche’ for jargon and legalese, since non-lawyers and non-
professionals may need to, and in any case must, have access to the legislation too. As 
audiences become more specialized and more educated in technical areas, they expect texts 
that are targeted to their particular needs.39 But, since accessibility of legislation is directly 
linked to Bingham’s rule of law40, passing inaccessible legislation under the feeble excuse that 
its primary audience possesses specialist knowledge is not easily acceptable.  At the other 
extreme, urban legislation offering incentives to slum inhabitants to move away to other 
accommodation is primarily intended to the local authorities administering the scheme and 
mainly to the slum inhabitants themselves: here, te plainer one can be, the better, 
But how ‘plain’ must legislation be? Even within the ‘Heather Cole’ persona there is 
plenty of diversity. There is commonality in the lack of legal or specialist training, but the 
sophistication of Heather Coles can range from a fiercely intelligent and generally 
sophisticated user to a rather naïve, perhaps illiterate, and even intellectually challenged 
individual. Which of those Heather Coles is the legislation speaking to? Certainly not ‘the 
average man on the street’: to start with, there are also women on our streets, and they are users 
of urban legislation too; and then, why are the above or below averages amongst us excluded 
from legislative communication?64 Since effectiveness is the goal of legislative texts, should 
                                                 
39 See K. A. Schriver, ‘Plain Language through Protocol-Aided Revision’ in E. R. Steinberg (ed.), Plain 
Language: Principles and Practice (Detroit, Wayne State University Press, 1991), 148, 152.  
40 See Lord Simon of Glaisdale, ‘The Renton Report-Ten Years On’ (1985) Statute Law Review 133. 64 
See J. Kimble, ‘Answering the Critics of Plain Language’ (1994-1995) 5 The Scribes Journal of Legal 
Writing 51, 59.  
 legislation not speak to each and every user who falls within the subjects of the policy solution 
expressed by this specific legislative text? This includes the above average, the average, and 
the below average people.   
And so urban law drafters must come to terms with the fact that their audience is not 
purely specialist. In fact, it ranges from super specialist (legal or professional) to ‘the below 
average’ person on the street. Not all urban laws speak to all of the users, and so there is scope 
for sophisticated texts but access to urban legislation is the balancing factor here. ‘In the 
absence of instructions to the contrary, drafters are not only entitled to write for this audience 
but may even have a professional obligation to do so’.41  
  
3. ‘Blue sky’ drafting tools in aid of urban law drafters  
  
The study of legislation is a dynamic field and debates on how to achieve effective laws are 
ripe. Out of all initiatives considered advantageous for urban law audiences, there are three 
blue sky mechanisms especially useful for better urban law. All three respond to the special 
challenges of urban law drafting, namely to the need for urban law to speak to three diverse 
user groups with a single text: the layered structure promotes a three tier structure for 
legislative texts each addressed to each of the three user groups; the typography inspired 
presentation and layout responds to the need to bring to light the main regulatory messages in 
legislation; and the interactive electronic statute book highlights the interconnectivity between 
legislative texts within the statute book as a whole.      
  
a. The layered approach to structure  
  
                                                 
41 See R. Sullivan, ‘The Promise of Plain Language Drafting’ (2001) 47 McGill Law Journal 97, 114.  
 Currently legislative texts are structured in application to Lord Thring’s Five Rules of 
Drafting42 that offers precedence to provisions declaring the law versus provisions relating to 
the administration of the law; to simpler versus the more complex proposition; and to principal 
versus subordinate provisions. Exceptional, temporary, and provisions relating to the repeal of 
Acts, and procedure and matters of detail should be set apart.  
The application of Thring’s rules have led to a traditional legislative structure of 
preliminary provisions [long title; preamble; enacting clause; short title; commencement; 
duration/expiry; application; purpose clause; definitions; interpretation]; principal provisions 
[substantive; administrative]; miscellaneous [offences and provisions ancillary to offences; 
miscellaneous and supplementary]; and final [savings and transitional; repeals; consequential 
amendments; schedules]. Current plain language interventions have led to a bare top text that 
leads the user straight to the main regulatory message: preliminary [introductory text/long title, 
enacting clause, start/expiry date with a hanging clause for a Schedule, hanging clause for 
definitions, application]; substantive and administrative [principal, subordinate] and final 
provisions [savings, duration/expiry where not in preliminary of Schedule, transitional, 
repeals, consequential amendments, purpose clause with tangible criteria for effectiveness that 
are applied in pre and post legislative scrutiny, short title, Schedules [definitions, other].  
But there is much scope for blue sky innovation by use of the layered approach43. The 
rationale behind the modern approach lies with the logical sequence of provisions within the 
text, which reflects logic, and philosophical and linguistic approaches to language and thought. 
This basis has now been overcome by the crucial evidence on the three user groups for 
legislation. Heather Cole, Mark Greene, and Jane Booker are diverse users that require diverse 
pitches of the legislative text. Speaking to all three of them at the same time is a rather complex, 
for some impossible, task. Introducing three versions of the same legislative text is a possibility 
but it is a recipe for disaster on such a diverse range of grounds, moral, ethical, constitutional, 
practical: rule of law, issues of interpretation between versions, identifying which version 
corresponds to each user, using that version as opposed to the one selected by the user, who 
                                                 
42 See Lord Thring, Practical Legislation, The Composition and Language of Acts of Parliament and Business 
Documents (London, 1902), 38; also see V.C.R.A.C. Crabbe, Legislative Drafting (Oxford, Cavendish 
Publishing, 1998), 148-150.  
43 The term, and to a certain extent, the concept is attributed to John Witing, Tax Director at the Tax  
Simplification Office. I am very grateful to John Witing for his inspiration and the generosity with which he has 
shared it with me.   
 subjects each user to their corresponding persona, ethical and moral consequences of the 
application of a diverse version for each user. And the parallel existence of three different texts 
could be counter-productive: users currently choose to use the complex but official legislative 
text over any of the many interpretation aids offered by government. If the plethora of attractive 
user friendly manuals and policy documents are shunned in favour of legislative texts, what 
makes it probable that users will go to the simple Heather Cole text as opposed to the legal 
Jane Booker one that reflects users’ perception of legislation? And so remaining with a single 
text is really the only option. But this is exactly what has imprisoned urban law drafters in the 
struggle for simplicity within legislative texts.   
It is now possible to see that each user group has its individual requirements for 
legislative information that are distinct from those of the other user groups. Identifying the 
needs for legislative information for each user group at a provision, rather than text, level 
would allow drafters to imitate oral communication, and pitch the legislative text to specific 
abilities and requirements. Drafters of legislative texts can now begin to think what regulatory 
or legal message is relevant to each group, and structure the text accordingly.   
The layered approach promotes the division of legislation into three parts, 
corresponding to each of the three profiles of legislative users. Part 1 can speak to lay persons: 
the content is limited to the main regulatory messages, thus conveying the essence of law 
reform attempted by the legislation, focusing gravely on the information that lay persons need 
in order to become aware of a new regulation, to comply with new obligations, or to enjoy new 
rights. Part 2 can speak to non-legally trained professionals who use the legislation in the 
course of their employment. Here one can see scope for further detail in the regulatory 
messages introduced, and for language that is balanced [technical, yet approachable to the 
professionals in question]. Part 3 of the legislation can then deal with issues of legislative 
interpretation, issues of procedure, and issues of application, in a language that is complex but 
not quite legalese, as there is nothing to prevent all groups from reading all parts.  
The layered approach is revolutionary, as it shifts the criterion for legislative structure 
from the content and nature of provisions to the profile of the users. It switches on a user-
centred structure, thus promoting both a link between policy and its effecting legislative text 
but also enhancing and personalising the channel of communication between drafters and 
users. And it applies and reflects the modern doctrine of contextualism in language and 
philosophy. But it cannot be viewed as a complete departure from tradition, as it continues to 
 apply Lord Thring’s five rules. By requiring that Part 1 includes the primary regulatory 
message, it promotes Lord Thring’s rules that give precedence to the simpler proposition. And 
by structuring legislation into three parts, the layered approach complies with the other Thing 
rules that require division of provisions declaring the law [in Part 1 or 2] with provisions 
administrating the law [in Part 2 or 3 accordingly]; that principal provisions should be 
separated from subordinate [in Parts 1 and 2]; that exceptional, temporary, and provisions 
relating to the repeal of Acts should be separated from the other enactments, and placed by 
themselves under separate headings [in Part 3]; and that procedure and matters of detail should 
be set apart by themselves [either in Part 3 of the layered approach, or in a Schedule].  
The layered approach seems to be one of the promising initiatives in the field of 
legislation. But there are three points that need to be clarified. First, the layered approach may, 
but will not necessarily, lead to a partial, fragmented, or incomplete legislative communication 
to Heather Cole. There is no doubt that an erroneous application of the approach could result 
to that. But the placement of the main messages in Part 1 per se must be seen as an added bonus 
to lay users compared with the current state of affairs: in the layered approach the now 
frequently elusive main regulatory message will be easily identified, will be brought forward 
in a pronounced place at the beginning of the legislative text, and will be expressed in a 
language that is accessible to lay users. Compared to the current state of affairs, where the main 
message is communicated somewhere within the legislative text and is expressed in the layered 
approach’s Part 2 or 3 language, this is certainly an improvement. And of course, there is 
nothing preventing Heather Cole from reading the rest of the text: in fact, an inviting Part 1 
can only encourage Heather Cole to keep reading, whilst offering her a clear context within 
which her understanding of complex and detailed messages can only be enhanced.  
Second, although Part 1 carrying the main regulatory message is distinctly different 
from Parts 2 and 3, it may be unclear what really distinguishes between Part 2 data and Part 3 
data: both Mark Green and Jane Booker are able to handle complexity and technicality of 
legislative data. However, they do not both require the same data, as demonstrated by their 
motives when using www.legislation.gov.uk: Mark Green is interested in answers that allow 
him to perform his professional but non-legal duties, whereas Jane Booker seeks legal 
information. As a result, what Mark Green needs is a clear understanding of substantive and 
procedural requirements imposed by the legislation, whereas Jane Booker seeks deeper 
statutory interpretation often coupled with a holistic view of the statute book. As a result, Part 
 2 of the layered approach involves answers to questions such as who must do what by when, 
and what happens if they don’t. Part 3 will delve deeper into intricate distinctions and possible 
exceptions that relate to statutory interpretation and interconnections between legislative texts 
within the statute book. There are two caveats here. One, Mark Green must still read the text 
as a whole. And Part 3 cannot be viewed as a mere shell of definitions, repeals, and 
consequential amendments: this would deprive the readers from at least part of the benefits of 
the layered approach.   
Third, it would be inappropriate to consider that the simplification serviced by the 
layered approach would result to an abolition of the need for explanatory materials for 
legislation. In fact, as the layered approach results in an inherent fragmentation of data, it 
renders the use of explanatory materials and notes reinstating the fluidity of information and 
the cross-fertilisation between parts an ever so crucial requirement. The new style of 
explanatory notes44 introduced by Good Law and showcased in the Armed Forces (Service 
Complaints and Financial Assistance) Bill [HL] Explanatory Notes 45  enhance the layered 
approach by introducing a clear table of contents that is thematic rather than provision based, 
with information on the policy and legal context of the Act, and with simple narratives on the 
main regulatory messages for all three user groups.46   
  Ultimately, the proof of the layered approach is in its application. User testing can 
prove whether it works in urban law, which user group for, and how it can be amended or fine-
tuned to serve users better.   
  
  
b. Legislative image: presentation, layout, pictures  
  
                                                 
44 See Office of Parliamentary Counsel, ‘Explanatory Notes Pilot: Response to Consultation’, April 2015, 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/427779/explanatory_notes_respo 
nse_to_consultation_on_pilot.pdf.   
45 See https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/377467/new-
formatexplanatory-notes.pdf.   
46 See http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/bills/lbill/2014-2015/0003/en/15003en.htm.   
 Plain language has always advocated the need to rethink the layout of legislative texts.47 The 
single font, the lack of adequate contrast between paper and text, the unique format are 
elements of the current legislative image that prevent the user from identifying the important 
aspects of the regulatory message thus reducing readability of legislative texts. Legislative 
texts attempt to convey a ‘legislative story’ to the user, thus allowing them to identify and 
then understand the underlying policy, the legislative choices made, and the rationale behind 
the text. This offers them the ability to read and interpret the text in context, thus making 
accessibility easier and more secure.  The importance of layout in accessibility of the story 
behind legislation cannot be underestimated: layout and font diversification can bring out the 
important regulatory messages. More white space and a slight change of font coupled with 
shorter sections and sentences; structure in parts and sections, headings, and a table of 
contents [also known as a table of arrangements] are all tools that promote clearer layout for 
the purposes of enhancing readability. This is all the more important in urban laws where the 
message is inevitably complex but the effect on citizens profound. 
Layout alone cannot adequately respond to a complex text, to a complex regulatory 
message, or indeed to a complex policy. It will contribute to simplification but with the aid of 
additional visual tools. One of those tools that have been ignored by even the most visionary 
of legislative academics and practitioners is the use of image in legislation. Images have been 
used in legislation that introduces national flags, traffic signs, or planning regulations. But the 
relationship between picture and legislation has not been explored fully. The visual arts could 
play a significant role here: there is nothing more direct, relevant to a wide range of users, and 
time resistant than Cain swinging his club above the prostrate Abel in Titian’s painting in Santa 
Maria della Salute in Venice. The visual representations of themes relating to wrongdoing are 
so emotionally charged and the characters shown in such magnification that, combined with 
beauty and other aesthetic values, picture has had tremendous impact on the viewer. Perhaps 
the inclusion of images in legislation can enhance the quality of communication. And urban 
law is very fertile as a ground for that purpose: planning diagrams and visual aids have been 
in use in urban laws for quite a while now. What would be interesting is to transfer into image 
the main regulatory message. For example, a prohibition of throwing waste in a river can easily 
be translated in an image, thus transferring the message over to illiterate people who may have 
                                                 
47 See Office of Scottish Parliamentary Counsel, ‘Plain language and legislation’, February 2006, 
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 used this practise before. The use of typographical and visual aids in legislation can enhance 
readability48 immensely. They can address textual limitations and can take the user further by 
banishing the barriers or written textual communication.    
  
c. The statute book as a whole  
 Reforming the structure and layout of individual legislative texts may bear little fruit without 
changes in the statute book as a whole. Addressing the issue of legislative volume that 
enhances complexity49 has been at the forefront of the agendas of the last two UK 
governments as the epicentre of regulatory quality. The Better Regulation Task Force’s 
‘Principles of Good Regulation’77 linked better regulation with less legislation, and offered a 
number of regulatory alternatives: do nothing; advertising campaigns and education; using 
the market; financial incentives; self-regulation and voluntary codes of practice; and 
prescriptive regulation. In ‘The Coalition: our programme for government’50 the UK 
government undertook to cut red tape51 by introducing a ‘one-in, one-out’ rule whereby no 
new regulation is brought in without other regulation being cut by a greater amount;52 and to 
impose sunset clauses on regulations; and to give the public the opportunity to challenge the 
worst regulations. In fact, subsequently the government went one step further and introduced 
a one-in two-out approach. It undertook to use regulation for the achievement of its policy 
objectives only where non-regulatory approaches cannot lead to satisfactory outcomes; cost 
benefits analysis demonstrates a clear margin of superiority of regulation to alternative, self-
regulatory, or non-regulatory approaches; or the regulation and the enforcement framework 
                                                 
48 See G. Jones, P. Rice, J. Sherwood, J. Whiting ‘Developing a Tax Complexity Index for the UK’, 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/285944/OTS_Developing_a_Tax 
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50 See ‘The Coalition: our programme for government’,  
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government.pdf.   
51 For further information on the Red Tape Challenge, see 
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52 http://www.bis.gov.uk/assets/biscore/better-regulation/docs/o/11-671-one-in-one-out-methodology.  
 can be implemented in a fashion which is demonstrably proportionate; accountable; 
consistent; transparent and targeted.53A recent OECD Review pronounced the regulatory 
reforms in the UK as impressive.54 Points of excellence include the effective balance between 
policy breadth and the stock and the flow of regulation; and the extensive application of EU’s 
Better Regulation initiatives in the UK55. So there is a lesson of good practice here, especially 
with reference to urban law, a field of regulation that is characterised by multi-faceted layers 
of complex and voluminous red tape. Clearing up the statute book by means of codification 
can lead to a rationalisation of the regulatory messages, a clarification of conflicting 
provisions, and a prioritisation of goals and policies. Expressed with plain language, the 
combination can lift urban laws to greater accessibility and ultimately greater implementation 
and ultimate success.  
But of course innovations to the statute book do not end with legislative volume. Search 
ability of urban legislation is another point of concern: offering search tools by keyword or 
topic can allow users an accurate image to the legal regime as it stands today! In the UK, The 
National Archives’ John Sheridan leads current thinking both at the theoretical level of viewing 
the statute book as a collection of big data, and at the application level of presenting a prototype 
of a radically reformed screen presenting legislation at www.legislation.gov.uk. Our Big Data 
in Law project56 revolutionized the way in which the statute book is viewed and led to big data 
applications and capabilities to UK legislation as a coherent, interrelated, and up to date whole. 
The project created a search mechanism for researchers allowing them to instigate research on 
legislation as a body: from the census that allows counting for example the number of ‘shall’ 
in UK legislation throughout the years to the introduction of methodology tools that provide 
empirical data on aspects of the statute book or the whole of the statute book.57 This entirely 
new and free resource for the research community offers pre-packaged analyses of the data, 
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 new open data from closed data, and creates the capability of identifying pattern language for 
legislation, which would encapsulate commonly occurring legislative solutions to commonly 
occurring problems thus facilitating legislative communication. The project, which has just 
concluded, enhances user [in this case researchers’] understanding of the interrelations and 
interconnections between legislative texts, within fields of law, and across fields of law.  
The project feeds into the great efforts led by The National Archives to review the way in 
which legislation is ‘served’ to users by offering unprecedented capabilities of identifying 
relevant legislative texts, such as delegated legislation, cross referenced texts, definitions of 
terms used in a legislative text, and, in the long term, even case-law clarifying or applying the 
text to cases. There are already two prototypes of the new screen for legislation. Both have 
been tested in user testing undertaken by BunnyFoot and including iris trackers as a means of 
assessing how long a user’s eye spends in each part of the text, where the eye is searching for 
further information and where on the screen, and where the user fails to understand the text or 
the cross reference completely. This work is of profound importance. What is missing for the 
purposes of legislative readability is context, and this is what the new screen can provide. This, 
along with the new format of explanatory notes, can finally offer the user an accurate picture 
of the labyrinth of legislative data in all their complexity and cross-wiring. Would such 
mechanisms facilitate the urban law user? Of course they would: they could depict an accurate 
image of legislative regulation on the topic searched, thus demonstrating if clear answers can 
be found or if it is time for the user to accept that statutory interpretation by a trained legal 
professional is what is really needed in that case.       
  
4. The theoretical umbrella: phronetic legislative drafting  
  Legislative innovation is happening all over the world. This rampage of fresh and innovative 
thinking is not haphazard: it reflects, and is evidence of, academic innovation in legislative 
studies theory. Until recently legislative drafting was viewed as a mere skill, normally and 
mostly, served by government lawyers. But things have changed. Legislation became the 
focus of regulation replacing the common law. There are a number of possible causes for this 
phenomenon: the Europeanisation of law offered common law systems the opportunity to 
appreciate more the feared statutory law; legal globalisation led to an emphasis on 
international statutory law (treaties etc.) that required national implementation via national 
 statutory law; and finally the realisation that regulation was passed for the purposes of 
achieving measurable results led to the inevitable [and not always fortunate] use of statutory 
law as a method of regulation. Whatever the reason, it invited a detailed study of statutory 
law from its conceptualisation to its implementation. And paved the way for a new theory for 
legislative drafting58.   
The traditional view, mostly within the common law world, is that drafting is a pure 
form of art59 or a quasi-craft60: if drafting is an art or a craft, then creativity and innovation lies 
at the core of the task; rules and conventions bear relative value. In the civil law world drafting 
is viewed as science99 or technique61: it carries formal rules and conventions whose inherent 
nomoteleia manages to produce predictable results. But, if drafting is viewed as a sub-
discipline of law, then there is a third option: law is not part of the arts, nor is it part of the 
sciences62 in the positivist sense.63 In science rules apply with universality and infallibility:  
gravity will always make an object fall down. Law is different: ‘All law is universal but about 
some things it is not possible to make a universal statement which will be correct... the error is 
not in the law nor in the legislator but in the nature of the thing’.103 But rejecting the view that 
drafting is a science does not necessarily confirm that drafting is an art. Art tends to lack any 
sense of rules. In the pursuit of aesthetic pleasure, art uses whatever tools are available. Art is 
anarchic. Drafting is not. Of course its rules are not rigid, but they are present. There may be 
exceptions to all rules of drafting, but this does not mean that there are no rules. And these 
rules carry with them a degree of relevant predictability, since the latter is one of the six 
elements of theory.64   
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 For Aristotle65 all human intellectuality can be classified as66 science as episteme; art 
as techne; or phronesis107 as the praxis of subjective decision making on factual circumstances 
or the practical wisdom of the subjective classification of factual circumstances to principals 
and wisdom as episteme.67 Law and drafting seem to be classical examples of phronesis, as 
they are liberal disciplines with loose but prevalent rules and conventions whose correct 
application comes through knowledge and experience. Drafting as phronesis is ‘akin to 
practical wisdom that comes from an intimate familiarity with contingencies and uncertainties 
of various forms of social practice embedded in complex social settings’.68 The art of drafting 
lies with the subjective use and application of its science, with the conscious subjective 
Aristotelian application and implementation of its universal theoretical principles to the 
concrete circumstances of the problem.69 Phronesis supports the selection of solutions made 
on the basis of informed yet subjective application of principles on set circumstances. 70 
Phronesis is ‘practical wisdom that responds to nuance and a sense of the concrete, outstripping 
abstract or general theories of what is right. In this way, practical wisdom relies on a kind of 
immediate insight, rather than more formal inferential processes’.71 And so drafting legislation 
simply involves the choice of the appropriate rule or convention that delivers the desired results 
within the unique circumstances of the specific problem at any given time. And, under this 
functional prism, successful drafting is the production of a good law, namely an effective law 
that contributes to regulatory efficacy. 72  There is nothing technical with qualitative 
functionality here: what counts is the ability of the law to achieve the reforms requested by the 
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 policy officers. In view of the myriad of parameters that are unique in each dossier, there are 
no precise elements of quality at this level.   
This qualitative definition of quality in legislation respects and embraces the 
subjectivity and flexibility of phronetic legislative drafting.114 Phronetic legislative drafting 
does not ignore the elements of art and science identified within the discipline; it focuses on 
the subjectivity of prioritisation in the selection of the most appropriate virtue to be applied by 
the drafter in cases of clash between equal virtues. But subjectivity is not anarchic: it is 
qualified by means of recognising effectiveness as the sole overriding criterion for that choice. 
In phronetic legislative drafting one must be able to identify basic principles which, as a rule, 
can render a law good. The pyramid in the beginning of this paper presents such principles: 
when applied, at least in the majority of cases, they lead to good law. Yet the ultimate criterion 
of good law is its effectiveness, at least under the prism of phronetic legislative theory, a theory 
that has innovated legislative study and legislative practice. This must now be applied to urban 
law.   
  
5. Conclusions  
This paper attempted to scratch the surface of quality in the area of urban law. The study of 
urban legislation has been revolutionised by the availability of accurate empirical data on 
user profiles. We now know that at least the electronic version of UK legislation is used by 
the legal professions, non-legal professions, and lay persons. Legislation has now found its 
audience, and clearly it is not just lawyers and judges.  
The application of this new knowledge to the plain language requirements of knowing 
your audience and pitching legislation to their level of legal awareness has had, and is expected 
to have, earth shaking consequences to the structure of legislative texts, to the presentation of 
legislative texts, and to the focus on the statute book as a whole.   
There are of course further, some could call them blue sky, innovations that rise through 
the horizon: the layered structure of legislative texts, the use of image or picture in legislative 
texts, the interactive prototypes of www.legislation.gov.uk.  
 Whatever one’s views of blue sky tools might be, there is wide realisation that urban 
legislation can no longer take the disproportionate burden of legislative complexity. 
Legislative quality requires urban legislation that is effective, in other words urban laws that 
can produce the desired regulatory results. In turn, this requires an understanding that urban 
policy must seek empirically based concrete goals. The tools for achieving urban policy goals 
extend to a plethora of options aside of legislation. Urban legislation is an effective tool for 
achieving those aims but not a panacea. Urban legislation is the effective expression of good 
urban regulation. Good urban laws are effective laws. They are texts that can produce the 
desired regulatory results, which are expressed by the drafter and are assessed via pre and post 
legislative scrutiny by the Parliament. Effectiveness in urban legislation can be achieved by 
clarity, precision, and unambiguity. Gender neutral language and plain language are tools of 
clear urban laws. Plain language is a tool of communication between the drafter and the urban 
law user. Urban law users are diverse and vary from expert professionals to illiterate citizens 
of below average mental capacity. The diversity of urban law users combined with the 
inevitably complex messages of urban laws requires a visionary approach the legislation and 
its drafting. Blue sky innovations, such as layered texts, the use of image in urban laws, and 
the viewing of urban legislation as a set of big data can and will promote accessibility further. 
But at the end of the day what matters is an understanding that urban law, and indeed 
all law, belongs to each and every citizen, not just layers and judges. So let us open the debate 
on how to apply the crucial legislative innovations in the area of urban law. It is a juicy debate 
that can produce gratifying results. 
